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Bain: Bain: Bridging the Procedural Gap:

BRIDGING THE PROCEDURAL GAP:
ARBITRATION DECISIONS AS A BASIS
FOR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL'
Benjamin v. Traffic Executive Association Eastern Railroads2

I. INTRODUCTION

Courts have long used the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude
relitigation of previously determined issues. The fora for the previous determination is of importance in deciding whether to apply the doctrine. This Note will
examine the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to arbitration
decisions. In deciding the question, the courts' major consideration is the degree
of procedural differences between the arbitration proceeding and a judicial
proceeding. The more closely an arbitration resembles litigation in the procedural
safeguards employed, the more likely that the arbitral decision will be accorded
a preclusive effect. Unfortunately, as arbitration proceedings become more like
litigation, their effectiveness and desirability decreases.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

A. Policy and Analysis
The public faith in a judicial system rests on the predictability and effectiveness of that system. 3 A party seeking resolution of a dispute 4 must be afforded
a degree of certainty in the outcome and knowledge that the resolution will be

1. For purposes of this Note, the effect of arbitration decisions on the doctrine of collateral
estoppel will be limited to federal court proceedings.
2. 869 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1989).
3. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 15354 (1979); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 GEO. L.J. 857, 858
(1966).
4. See Southern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897) (stating "the very object for
which civil courts have been established . . . is to secure the peace and repose of society by the
settlement of matters capable of judicial determination"). See also Montana, 440 U.S. at 153 (a major
goal of the judicial process is finality).
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6
final. 5 Courts developed the doctrine of collateral estoppel as one measure for
ensuring that these policies are fulfilled.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a party or its privy from
relitigating any factual issue which has been "actually litiated" in a prior action
and which was necessary to the resolution of that action. Collateral estoppel is
8
used when the subsequent suit's basis is a different cause of action and in
certain circumstances, may involve those who were not parties to the original
action. 9 The estopped party, however, may oppose the preclusion if it was not
given a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate the particular issue in the original
action. 10 Thus, collateral estoppel prevents needless litigation on previously
determined issues, which promotes judicial economy, while being tempered by
notions of fairness to the litigants." In deciding whether to collaterally estop
the relitigation of an issue, courts do not question whether the prior determination

5. See Southern PacificR.R., 168 U.S. at 48-49 (enforcing rules preventing repetitious litigation
is necessary to maintain social order); Montana, 440 U.S. at 153 ("Application of both doctrines [res
judicata and collateral estoppel] is central to the purpose for which civil courts have been established,
the conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdiction."). See also Brown, 442 U.S. at 131
(preclusion ensures judicial finality); Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917)
(The Court states that preclusion "is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, 'of public policy and
of private peace' ...." (citing Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907))); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4416 (1981) [hereinafter WRIGHT].
6. See 1B J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405[11] (1988)
(where collateral estoppel is viewed as a part of res judicata) [hereinafter MOORE]. The terms "claim
preclusion" and "issue preclusion" are the modem terms for res judicata and collateral estoppel,
respectively. This Note will use the terms res judicata and collateral estoppel. See also Holland,
Modernizing Res Judicata: Reflections on the Parklane Doctrine, 55 IND. L.J. 615, 615-16 (1980).
Broadly, res judicata encompasses the effect of a final judgment both as a bar to further action upon
the same claim, and as an estoppel as to matters necessarily litigated, although the claim in the
subsequent action is different. MOORE, 0.405[1]. Recent cases tend to limit the term res judicata
to the former usage and limit the term collateral estoppel to the latter. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90, 94 (1980) (noting the limited interpretation of res judicata); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
7. See Allen, 449 U.S. at 94; ParklaneHosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 326; Montana, 440 U.S. at 153;
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876). Certain prerequisites must be met before
applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel: (1) the issue must be the same as that involved in the
prior action; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior action; and (3) the determination of the issue must have been an essential part of the judgment in the prior action. See Greenblatt
v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352,1360 (11th Cir. 1985); Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi,
704 F.2d 241,243-44 (5th Cir. 1983); Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1381 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983).
8. See Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1982).
9. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 331.
10. SeeAllen, 449 U.S. at 95; Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971), reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1133 (1982).
11. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927,929 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,323 U.S. 720(1944)
(only the determination of "ultimate" facts will be binding in subsequent litigation).
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was right or wrong, 12 but rather whether the issue was clearly decided and
necessary to that determination.
Policies favoring judicial economy 13 and prevention of inconsistent
results 14 prompted the judiciary to formulate 15 the doctrine of collateral
estoppel as well as the doctrine of res judicata. 16 These policies may outweigh
other important judicial policies creating limited exceptions to the application of
issue preclusion. Courts have concern when the application of collateral estoppel
infringes on a party's federally protected rights. An arbitration decision should not
be afforded a preclusive effect; federal treatment of an issue should not be
barred 17 when Congress intended resolution of the statutory claim to be obtained
19
in a judicial forum, 18 and arbitration cannot ade uately protect that claim.
°
When is an issue decided through arbitrationl considered to be actually

12. See WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 4416 (discussing the various interests served by issue
preclusion, and its dangers).
13. "To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves
judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent
decisions." Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54 (1979).
14. Id.
15. Preclusion is a judicially created doctrine that restricts parties from relitigating claims or issues
previously determined. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 5, §§ 4401-4426 (discussing rules of
preclusion).
16. There are three characteristic differences between the two doctrines. Res Judicata prevents
relitigation of claims; collateral estoppel ends controversy over issues. Res judicata applies regardless
of whether there has been an adversary contest on a particular matter; collateral estoppel operates only
when an issue has been litigated fully. Res judicata precludes only subsequent suits on the same cause
of action; collateral estoppel may preclude relitigation of issues in later suits on any cause of action.
J. FRIEDANTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 613 (1988).
17. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
18. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 285; Barrentine,450 U.S. at 743-46; Alexander, 415 U.S. at 4445.
19. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 285 (arbitration cannot provide an adequate substitute for judicial
proceedings of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Barrentine,450 U.S. at 743-46 (arbitration procedures
are less protective of statutory rights than judicial procedures); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44-45
(inadequate procedures can make arbitration a less appropriate forum for determining claims on
statutory rights).
20.
Arbitration, like judicial litigation, is a process of dispute resolution whereby an
impartial 'judge' evaluates evidence and renders an opinion through reference
to general principles of law. Unlike judicial litigation, arbitration typically
permits the parties to select their own arbitrator, to stipulate to rules of evidence
and procedure, to impose limitations on the arbitrator's power, and to determine
the substantive legal rules governing the decisional process. As a non-judicial
alternative, arbitration has the potential to alleviate overburdened court dockets,
minimize the preparation of cases, reduce the expense and delay of litigation and
relitigation, and improve compliance with awards. In addition, arbitrators who
possess greater expertise in the subject matter of the dispute are likely to render
more equitable decisions.
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litigated for purposes of collateral estoppel in a subsequent federal court
proceeding? To date, this question is answered on a case-by-case basis. 21 The
Restatement of Judgments (Second) § 84 likewise suggests a case-by-case
analysis. 22 A common analysis used by courts faced with this question is to
analyze the procedural and fundamental aspects 23of the arbitration and to compare
them to the procedures employed in litigation.
Parties using arbitration may agree to the guidelines to be followed in
resolving the dispute, thereby tailor-making the proceeding. 24 Thus, differences
necessarily result between arbitral and court proceedings and create the problem
presented here. Commonly, arbitration proceedings are less formal than trials and
involve less strict evidentiary standards, 25 informal discovery, 26 and incomplete written reports. 27 Requiring a formal proceeding would defeat the
effectiveness of arbitration.
A court must first consider whether the issue in controversy falls within the
28
scope of either a valid agreement to arbitrate or a statute requiring arbitration.
If the case is appropriate for arbitration, the court decides whether another tribunal
actually determined the necessary issue in the prior proceeding and whether the
present issue is the same as the issue previously litigated. 2 The court also
looks to see if the parties to the former adjudication are the same as in the present

Mobilia, Offensive Use of CollateralEstoppel Arising Out of Non-JudicialProceedings,50 ALBANY
L. REV. 305, 305 (1986).
21. Note, The Preclusive Effect of Arbitral Determinations in Subsequent Federal Securities
Litigation, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 655, 665 (1987) ("Any rule of preclusion for arbitral determinations,
therefore, is judicially fashioned."). See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 288.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 comment (1982) (The comment explains:
"When the arbitration procedure leading to an award is very informal, the findings in the arbitration
should not be carried over through issue preclusion to another action where the issue would otherwise
be subjected to much more intensive consideration.").
23. Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel: Using Preclusion to Shape Procedural
Choices, 63 TULANE L. REV. 29, 32 ("Under the dominant approach, courts accord collateral estoppel
to arbitral findings on a case-by-case basis, depending on the magnitude of the differences between the
litigation and a given arbitration.").
24. See Legion Ins. Co. v. Insurance Gen. Agency, 822 F.2d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g
denied, 828 F.2d 772 (1987); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Air Florida Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988); Checkrite of San Jose, Inc. v. Checkrite, Ltd., 640
F. Supp. 234, 236 (D. Colo. 1986).
25. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 n.4 (1956).
26. See Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v. Newspaper Guild of Wilkes-Barre, Local 120, 559 F.
Supp. 875, 881 (M.D. Pa. 1982). However, parties to an arbitration have no power to invoke pretrial
discovery themselves. See Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980); Foremost Yam Mills,
Inc. v. Rose Mills, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 9, 11 (E.D. Pa. 1960). See Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public
Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 287-88 (1984) (discussing discovery in arbitration). For
citations to procedures of several arbitration organizations see Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259-62 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
27. See Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203-04; Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
28. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 214 (1985).
29. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc., 402 U.S. at 333 (1971) (citing Eisel v. Columbia Packing
Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301 (Mass. 1960)).
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dispute or if there are any other reasons bearing upon the applicability of collateral
30
estoppel.
B. The Caselaw
The case-by-case analysis used to determine the applicability of collateral
estoppel to arbitration decisions is exemplified by three major cases.
The Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.3 1 refused to
collaterally estop an employee bringing a Title VII racial discrimination suit
against his employer in federal district court. The arbitrator found that the
plaintiff was "discharged for just cause" which, if binding on the Title VII claim,
would necessarily cause the court to grant summary judgment against the
employee in the later action. 32 The Court did, however, allow the arbitral
findings to be entered into evidence. In reaching its decision, the Court notes that
commonly in an arbitration proceeding, "[t]he record of the arbitration proceeding
is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and
procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, crossexamination, and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable." 33 The Court further stresses that an arbitrator applies the "industrial
common law of the shop" 34 and has "no general authority to invoke public laws
that conflict with the bargain between the parties." 3 5 In so stating, the Court
focuses on the limits of an arbitrator's power which does not extend to interpreting
legislative intent. 36
In another leading case, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,37 the
Supreme Court refused to preclude relitigation of an issue concerning violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), but again allows the arbitral decision to
be entered into evidence. The BarrentineCourt, as in Alexander, notes that the
arbitrator's power pertains to the agreement between the parties and does not
extend to individual statutory rights which are protected by the FLSA and Title
38
VII.
In McDonald v. City of West Branch,39 the plaintiff brought suit in federal
court under section 1983 of Title 42 following an adverse arbitral determination.
The United States Supreme Court held that in a section 1983 action, "an
arbitration proceeding cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 331-33 (1979).
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Id.
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 59.
450 U.S. 728 (1981).
Id. at 746.
466 U.S. 284 (1984).
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trial.,,4 0 The Court held that "according preclusive effect to arbitration awards
the protection of federal rights
in [section] 1983 actions would severely undermine
41
that the statute is designed to provide."
The Supreme Court in each of these cases approaches the problem of arbitral
collateral estoppel on a case-by-case basis and bases its opinions on the differences
between arbitration and litigation. The differences in these particular cases would
create an infringement on a party's federally protected rights if the arbitration
findings were given a preclusive effect.
Applying collateral estoppel to judicial determinations promotes several
curative purposes, such as efficiency, 4 2 repose, 43 and consistency. 44 These
goals are also met by allowing arbitral collateral estoppel, but only when the
arbitration proceeding resembles litigation. The particular facts of a number of
cases presented to lower federal courts have led to collateral estoppel being
applied to arbitration decisions using the case-by-case analysis. 4 5 Federal courts
have a jurisdictional interest 46 to protect when considering whether to preclude
an issue determined outside of judicial fora. This interest is safeguarded by
requiring the party seeking collateral estoppel to prove the reliability of the
arbitration. 47 The reliability of an arbitral proceeding is analyzed by inquiry into
the standards of proof applied in arbitration, 48 whether or not the parties were

40. Id. at 292.
41. Id.
42. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153 (1979).
43. Id. at 153-54.
44. Id. at 154.
45. Commentators generally agree with the case-by-case approach. See WRIGHT, supra note 5,
§ 4475; Carlisle, Getting a FullBite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrineof Issue PreclusionMake
an Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a Court of Law?, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 63,
97-98 (1986); Note, supra note 21, at 674-79 (1987).
46. Rights implied under a federal statute should be granted the same protection as an express
cause of action because "[t]o say that a private cause of action is implied is to say that Congress
intended such an action to exist." Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir.
1986Xconcurring opinion). See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 223 ("Suffice it to say that in framing preclusion
rules in this context, courts shall take into account the federal interests warranting protection.").
47. See WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 4423, at 217 (under ordinary circumstances collateral estoppel
is available without a need to prove the quality of the prior determination).
48. See Kunzelman v. Thompson, 799 F.2d 1172, 1176 (7th Cir. 1986); Guenther v. Holmgreen,
738 F.2d 879, 888 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1212 (1985); WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 4422.
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represented by counsel,49 the availability of discovery,5 ° the evidentiary
52
standards 51 employed and the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.
These factors are fundamental indicia of arbitral reliability, but need not all
be present to apply collateral estoppel. 53 A court, in its discretion, may decide
that the arbitration decision was reliable and the parties suffered no disadvantage
by resolving their dispute outside the traditional judicial arena.5 4 The court must
examine the quality of the prior proceeding before invoking issue preclusion.
The Supreme Court has outlined the analysis courts should use before
collaterally estopping a party. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
likewise employed the requisite analysis to the facts of Benjamin v. Traffic
Executive Association Eastern Railroads.5 5
56

III. FACTS OF Benjamin

Appellants Benjamin and Downey represented discharged employees of the
defunct appellee Eastern Weighing and Inspection Bureau (EWIB). The other
appellees were organizations related to the EWIB; the Traffic Executive
Association Eastern Railroads (TEA-ER) and the Eastern Railroad Association
(ERA).5 7
Following the elimination of the EWIB, the appellants filed this class action
claiming entitlement to severance benefits under the Staggers Rail Act of 1980
(hereinafter the "Staggers Act ).58 The EWIB offered its discharged employees
severance benefits in exchange for a release of all claims against it. 59 These
benefits, however, failed to meet the minimum remunerative requirements of the

49. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (representation by counsel in civil or criminal
proceedings is an aspect of due process); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1118 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980) (a litigant "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him").
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (discovery entitles litigants to disclosure of relevant, non-privileged
information).
51. See FED. R. EvID. 402,403 (relevant evidence is admissible subject to a weighing of probative
value and prejudicial effect). See also Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352,
1361 (11th Cir. 1985) (parties presented relevant evidence indicating arbitral reliability).
52. See Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).
53. See Note, supra note 21, at 676-77.
54. See McDonald,466 U.S. at 291 (1984); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,57-58
(1974). Procedurally reliable arbitrations should be given the same deference as court determinations;.
a presumption on non-preclusion is not warranted.
55. 869 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1989).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 108-09.
58. The Interstate Commerce Commission shall require rail carrier members of a rate bureau to
provide the employees of such rate bureau who are affected by the amendments made by this section
with fair arrangements no less protective of the interests of such employees than those established
pursuant to section 11437 of Title 49, United States Code. 49 U.S.C. § 10706 note.
59. Benjamin, 869 F.2d at 109.
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"New York Dock Conditions" 60 provided by the Staggers Act. The appellants
complaint contained the Staggers Act claim (Count I) and additionally alleged
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Racketeering
Influenced and
61
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (Counts II through IV).
The Staggers Act deregulates the railroad rate industry and provides for
protective benefits to rate bureau employees discharged as a result of deregulation. 62 Any dispute whether those persons terminated were employees of a rate
bureau or not is subject to mandatory arbitration. 63 Thus, the appellees moved
to compel arbitration on the Staggers Act claim and the appellants consensually
submitted Count I to binding arbitration on a classwide basis. The terms of the
arbitration 64 included that the appellants would not
waive their right to have
65
Counts II through IV decided by the district court.
A majority of the three-member arbitration board expressly ruled that the
EWIB was not a rate bureau. 66 As a result of this finding, the terminated
employees represented by the appellants were not entitled to Staggers Act
benefits. 67 The arbitral decision was affirmed by the district court which denied
the appellants' motion for a trial de novo on Count 1.68 The crux of the instant
decision rests on the district court's use of the doctrine of collateral estoppel 6to9
grant summary judgment in favor of the appellees on Counts II through IV.
Counts IIthrough IV rely on a finding that the EWIB was actually a rate bureau
as defined by the Staggers Act. 70 The district court, however, estopped the
appellants from relitigating this issue because it had affirmed the 7arbitral
finding
1
that the represented employees were not rate bureau employees.
Appellants Benjamin and Downey challenged the district court's decision to
grant summary judgment in favor of the appellees on Counts II through IV, which
72
necessarily rely on the court's use of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling making the substantive rule of law: The findings of an arbitration

60. New York Dock Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1979).
61. Benjamin, 869 F.2d at 109.
62. 49 U.S.C. § 10706 (1982).
63. Id.
64. Both parties set up informal procedural rules to govern the arbitration proceeding. They
agreed to presentation of oral or written testimony, to extensive briefing and did, in fact, engage in
informal discovery. At the hearing the plaintiffs cross-examined the defendants' witnesses who
testified orally, and could have, if they had chosen, called in and cross-examined those witnesses who
submitted their testimony on paper. Benjamin, 869 F.2d at 109.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 109-10.
70. Id. at 110.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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board can serve as a basis for collateral estoppel where the arbitration does7 not
3
infringe on the court's jurisdictional interest in adjudicating federal claims.
IV. THE Benjamin74 COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Benjamin court begins its analysis by asserting that an arbitral finding can
serve as a basis for collateral estoppel.7 5 Neither party disputed this basic tenet.
The court did not elaborate on this well-accepted principle.
The court then analyzes the procedural aspects of the arbitration to determine
the propriety of employing collateral estoppel. 76 The Second Circuit cites the
Supreme Court's opinion in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore77 for the principle
that procedural differences between the prior action and the instant action may
justify not applying the collateral estoppel doctrine. 78 Though the arbitral
procedures were informal, the agreement did outline certain procedures, and there
was no indication that the arbitration board could not make a "reasoned decision"
because of the lack of formalities. 79 The Benjamin 80 court believes that the
procedural differences between this arbitration proceeding and a judicial
proceeding are insufficient to warrant not applying the doctrine. 8 1 The court
did, however, state that other factors, (i.e., resolving the prior action in an
inconvenient forum) could make the application of collateral estoppel unwarranted. 82 The court concludes that the appellants, indeed, had83 a "full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue before the arbitration board."
The court went on to state that such a ruling protects the judicial policy
favorin economic resolution of disputes and protects the parties from inconsistent
results. 84 In affirming the ruling of the district court, the Second Circuit states
that not granting the arbitral decision a preclusive effect "would have left open the
possibility for a result where the employees were not rate bureau employees under
Count I, but were rate bureau employees under Counts II through IV." 85
Conversely, a recent Second Circuit decision refused to render an arbitral
determination to be affected by res judicata, or claim preclusion. In Coppinger
v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad,86 the court held that an arbitral decision

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 114, 116.
869 F.2d 107.
Id. at 110.
Id.
439 U.S. 322 (1979).
Id. at 331.
Id.
869 F.2d 107.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
861 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1988).
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rendered pursuant to the Railway Labor Act could not be used to preclude
subsequent litigation on a section 1983 claim. The Benjamin8 7 court distinguishes Coppinger,8 8 yet uses that case to build its rationalization for collaterally
estopping the appellants. The distinction was founded on the different natures of
collateral estoppel and res judicata.
The court notes in Coppingerg that arbitration did not "protect constitutional guarantees as adequately as federal court procedures" and that the arbitrators
90
lacked the authority and competence to properly adjudicate a statutory right.
The Second Circuit further notes the Supreme Court's reluctance to "grant
arbitration findings preclusive effect over certain federal statutory and constitutional rights." 91 Since the issue presented to the arbitration board in the instant case
mandated application
was not a constitutional issue, but rather a Congressionally
92
of federal statutory law, the preclusion was proper.
93
V. THE EFFECTS OF Benjamin

The United States Supreme Court has recently questioned the assumption that
arbitral decisions have the same preclusive effect as court judgments. 94 In
Benjamin,9 5 the Second Circuit further defines the procedural differences
between litigation and arbitration
in determining whether or not to apply the
96
doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The court notes that the issue in question is a matter akin to the "law of the
shop" and well within the competence of the arbitration board. 97 Also, evidentiary standards were followed, the appellants had the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses, and discovery was available. 98 Such was not the situation in
99
Coppinger.

87. 869 F.2d 107.
88. 861 F.2d 33.
89. Id.
90. Benjamin, 869 F.2d at 112-13.
91. Id. at 113.
92. Id. The appellants further argued that application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel violated
their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Second Circuit, in refusing the argument, noted
that the parties only have a right to a jury trial over common law issues. The court stated, "The issue
of whether plaintiffs were rate bureau employees must be determined in a statutory proceeding which
is not in the nature of a suit at common law." Id. at 115.
93. 869 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1989).
94. See Dean Witter Reynolds Co. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221-23 (1985) ("We believe that the
preclusive effect of arbitration proceedings is significantly less well settled than the lower court
opinions might suggest ...").
95. 869 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1989).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 113.
98. Id.
99. 861 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1988).
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Bain: Bain: Bridging the Procedural Gap:

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

The question remains whether decisions such as Benjamin1° ° will narrow
the gap between litigation and arbitration. With courts examining the procedural
differences of the two dispute resolution techniques in deciding to accord a
preclusive effect to arbitration findings, parties may be forced to formalize
arbitration to take advantage of the important policies that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel protects. Such a result, however, lessens the desirability of arbitration as
an alternative to litigation.
Four recent decisions cite Benjamin10 1 for the general proposition that
arbitral decisions can be accorded a collateral estoppel effect.1 2 These cases
did not expand on the use of procedural differences as the determinative factor in
precluding issues previously decided in arbitration proceedings. Therefore, the
effect of Benjamin10 3 still remains.
ROBERT M. BAIN

100. 869 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1989).
101. Id.
102. See Leddy v. Standard Drywall, Inc., 875 F.2d 383, 385 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Arbitration
proceedings can, but do not necessarily, have preclusive effect on subsequent federal court
proceedings."); Matter of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R.R. Co., 882 F.2d 1188,1195 (7th
Cir. 1989) (collateral estoppel was not applied because the party to be estopped was not a party or
privy to the arbitration); Pennsylvania Engineering Corp. v. Islip Resource Recovery Agency, 710 F.
Supp. 456, 462-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Torre v. Falcon Jet Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 (D.N.J. 1989)
(the findings of an arbitrator can have a collateral estoppel effect so long as the proceeding was fair
and reliable).
103. 869 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1989).
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